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In the author's opinion, Prebisch's greatest contribution was 
his idea of a structural rift in the international economy 
caused by the slow spread of technical progress and kept in 
being by the international division of labour which existed 
at that time. According to this approach, external trade was 
no longer viewed as an extension of the domestic economy 
but was considered to have a dynamism of its own which 
depended on the linkages between the central economies 
and the efficiency of the principal centre in exercising its 
"regulatory" functions. 
An important difference between the United Kingdom 
and the United States, as principal centres, has been their 
degree of integration into the international economy. The 
United States had a low import coefficient, which weakened 
its potential external drive, whereas the United Kingdom 
had a high import coefficient: higher than that of its exports. 
Its trade deficit was covered by the remittances of profits 
generated abroad by its earlier investments. Those 
investments, for their part, had been financed by the initial 
trade balance generated by the country's situation of 
technological leadership. 
The United States had not received the necessary 
preparation to act as the principal centre, and it lacked the 
capacity to act as regulator of the world economy. The 
relative decline in its rate of increase of productivity and the 
simultaneous drop in its rate of saving, which were to be 
observed as from the early 1970s, prevented that country 
from playing the role of principal centre of the capitalist 
economy, and this process accelerated still further in the 
1980s with the appearance of a deficit which absorbed an 
amount of resources greater than the total private saving. 
At present, the United States continues to play part of 
its role as the principal centre, since the dollar still 
continues to play a very important part in the world 
economy. Other countries, however, are now the main 
suppliers of international resources. 
The article concludes that if the international economy 
is to keep on functioning without there being a true 
principal centre, there must be a system of regulation by 
consensus among the main central countries, and indeed, 
the world seems to be moving in this direction. 
•Professor at the University of the Sorbonne. 
In a summary presentation of his theoretical works, 
Raúl Prebisch referred to the idea of "a system of 
international economic relations which I named the 
'centre-periphery' system", which had arisen as a 
by-product of his reflections on the cyclical 
fluctuations that occur in international activities. At 
first, it seemed to him that the cycles originated in the 
economies of the industrialized countries and then 
spread to the international sphere. In that process of 
spreading, the countries specializing in the production 
and export of primary commodities behaved in a 
"passive" manner, even though the fluctuations in the 
level of economic activity affected them with 
particular force. 
This reflection on the spread of the cycle led 
Prebisch to perceive that the system of the 
international division of labour had arisen primarily 
to serve the interests of the countries which were in 
the vanguard of the industrialization process. "The 
countries producing and exporting raw materials were 
thus linked with the centre as a function of their 
natural resources, thereby forming a vast and 
heterogeneous periphery incorporated in the system 
in different ways and to different extents." 
This global view of the capitalist economy, 
which revealed that it was suffering from a structural 
break initially caused by the slow spread of technical 
progress and perpetuated by the system of the 
international division of labour which existed at that 
time, was Prebisch's main theoretical contribution 
and formed the starting point for the theory of 
underdevelopment which dominated Latin American 
thinking and strongly influenced other regions of the 
world too. For Prebisch, underdevelopment stems 
from "the concentration of technical progress and its 
fruits in economic activities oriented towards 
exports", giving rise to heterogeneous social 
structures "in which a large part of the population 
remains on the sidelines of development".3 
In this late synthesis of his ideas, Prebisch 
limited his explanation of the Centre-Periphery view 
to the structural imbalances caused by the slow spread 
of technical progress, which he claimed was 
responsible for the downward trend in the terms of 
Raúl Prebisch, "Five stages in my thinking on 
development", in Pioneers in Development, Gerald M. Meier and 
Dudley Seers (eds.), a World Bank publication, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1984, p. 175. 
2
 Ibid., pp. 176-177. 
3Ibid,p. 177. 
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trade of the commodity-exporting countries. In his 
classic text of 1949,4 however, Prebisch strove to 
construct the nucleus of a dynamic theory of the 
international economy on the basis of his 
Centre-Periphery view. He started with a critique of 
the current theory of balance-of-payments im-
balances, which was a mere extension of the 
quantitative theory of money, considered in this case 
as being a good of unlimited demand (gold). Prebisch 
denounced the static nature of this theory, which 
merely registers the fact that "each disturbance 
represents transition from one period of equilibrium 
to another". In his criticism he went further, 
however, noting that the prevailing theory might have 
had some validity when the centre of the capitalist 
economy was the United Kingdom, in view of the 
profound integration of that country into the system 
of the international division of labour, since the high 
degree of openness of the British economy (its import 
coefficient averaged over 30% between 1870 and 
1914) meant that that country had a considerable 
capacity to respond to external stimuli. In the 
economy of the United Kingdom, its exports 
"fulfilled a dynamic function similar to that of capital 
investment". If other industrialized countries 
activated their economies and increased their imports 
from the United Kingdom, the stimulating effect on 
the latter was felt immediately, so that British imports 
grew rapidly too. Thus, there was no tendency 
towards an accumulation of gold reserves by the then 
principal centre. 
According to Prebisch, this situation underwent a 
radical change when the United States took over the 
function of the principal centre of the capitalist 
economy, since its import coefficient was extremely 
low. If the cyclical reactivation began in the United 
States, then the external inductive power generated 
by that country's imports was only small; if it began 
in another industrial economy, then the response of 
the United States economy was extremely slow. This 
unfavourable situation for the peripheral economies 
-which depend on external impulses for their growth-
was rendered still more adverse by the constant 
downward trend in the latter country's import coef-
ficient, which sank from 6% in 1925 to 3.1% in 1949. 
See ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and 
(he Caribbean), "Growth, disequilibrium and disparities: interpreta-
tion of the process of economic development", Economic Survey of 
Latin America 1949 (E/CN.12/164/Rev.l), New York, Part I, 11 
January 1951, United Nations publication, Sales No. 1951.II.G.1. 
5
 Ibid., p. 38. 
6
 Ibid, p. 36. 
For Prebisch, the world economy is not just a 
structure which reproduces itself, but rather a system 
which registers cyclical expansion under the 
influence of the spread of technical progress. 
Departing from the traditional approach, which sees 
external trade as a mere prolongation of domestic 
productive activity -a sort of bartering of surpluses 
which makes it possible to increase the productivity 
of the relatively most abundant factors- Prebisch 
assigns it a dynamism of its own which depends on 
the interlinkages of the central economies and the 
efficiency with which the principal centre carries out 
its regulatory functions. 
Contrary to what is implicit in the traditional 
balance-of-payments theory, the time factor plays a 
fundamental part in Prebisch's concept, and this 
factor is a function of the degree of openness to the 
exterior of the principal centre. 
Technical progress spreads from the central 
economies outwards, while they in turn are under the 
influence of a principal centre. This process of 
interaction among the central economies underwent a 
considerable change when the United States became 
the principal centre. 
In contrast with the first aspect of the 
Centre-Periphery concept -which was the starting 
point of the theory of underdevelopment- this second 
aspect was not duly elaborated in the years following 
its formulation, even though balance-of-payments 
imbalances had become the main problem of the 
international economy from the 1960s onwards. 
Prebisch drew attention to the fact that when the 
United Kingdom was playing the role of the principal 
centre, its import coefficient was much higher than its 
export coefficient. Indeed, in the late 1920s the 
United Kingdom paid for a third or more of its 
imports with the profits from its investments abroad. 
The principal centre had initially built up its position 
thanks to its technological leadership, which was 
reflected in the strong penetration capacity of its 
exports and the consequent big trade surplus. Thus, a 
considerable proportion of British savings was quite 
naturally channelled abroad, so that, in a first stage, 
the principal centre played the self-created role of the 
main disseminator of technological progress. In a 
later stage, this principal centre received the benefit 
of the returns on these foreign investments: its 
currency was overvalued because of the entry of 
royalties and dividends, and this favoured an increase 
in imports over exports. This was the culmination of 
an economy which benefited from big returns from 
the profits generated abroad by previous investments. 
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Prebisch did not return to the question of the 
balance-of-payments adjustment problems of the 
central countries in the period following the 
appearance of his classic 1949 study. The entry into 
action of the Bretton Woods institutions seemed to 
indicate that this matter was now closed. 
In the period from the end of the Second World 
War to the end of the 1950s, the United States 
enjoyed a substantial trade surplus on the current 
account which permitted it to finance heavy spending 
abroad in both the military and investment fields. 
This was the period of the "dollar shortage", which 
many economists attributed to the positive 
productivity differential of the United States 
economy. At that time, it was taken for granted that 
its leading position as regards productivity -the result 
of heavy spending on research and development-
would guarantee the United States' position as the 
principal centre of the capitalist economy for a long 
time to come. The relatively faster growth of 
productivity observed immediately after the war in 
other industrialized countries was explained away as 
being due to the process of "economic recovery" in 
which they were involved. It was explained that when 
they got nearer the higher level which the United 
States had already reached, it would not be so easy 
for them to keep up uch high rates of growth in 
productivity. 
Since the 1960s, however, there has been a 
process of profound changes in the relations between 
the central economies which has seriously affected 
the United States' position as the principal centre. 
The system of fixed exchange rates, which linked the 
dollar to gold, gave rise to a patent overvaluation of 
that currency, which adversely affected the external 
competitiveness of the United States economy. 
Paradoxically, this situation favoured foreign 
investments by United States firms, which also helped 
to put pressure on the country's gold reserves. In 
1963, the Johnson Administration brought in the 
Interest Equalization Act, whereby it sought to check 
the outflow of capital -the first sign of weakness in 
the economy which had been acting as the principal 
centre of the capitalist world. An unexpected result of 
this measure was the strengthening of the incipient 
Eurodollar market, since United States enterprises 
operating abroad began to keep part of their liquid 
assets outside the country. With the accumulation of 
massive liquid assets in dollars in the Central Banks 
of certain central countries, as well as in United States 
private banks abroad, the convertibility of the dollar 
against gold could no longer be sustained. 
The official suspension of such convertibility 
took place in 1971 and gave rise to a big increase in 
the price of gold. The dollar value (and, to a lesser 
extent, the value in terms of other currencies) of 
reserves held in the form of this metal rose 
exorbitantly, thus greatly inflating international 
liquidity. Two years later the United States 
Government definitively abandoned the fixed 
exchange rate system. In spite of the intervention of 
the most powerful Central Banks, there was a 
considerable devaluation of the dollar vis-à-vis the 
currencies of the other central countries, and the 
resulting flight towards real assets gave rise to a wave 
of speculation on international markets. 
The prolonged overvaluation of the dollar -from 
the Second World War until 1973- must naturally 
have been a major influence in the weakening of the 
United States' position as the principal centre. In 
order to keep up that position, it would have been 
necessary to maintain a level of reserves and an 
accumulation of reproductive assets abroad capable 
of preserving the dollar from any threat whatever, 
regardless of the level of activity of the United States 
economy. The principal centre is the country which 
issues the currency that serves as a reserve for the 
whole of the capitalist system: a prerogative which 
naturally demands an exceptionally solid balance-of-
payments current account position. By this I mean 
solid not only vis-à-vis changes in the international 
situation but also with regard to abrupt changes in 
domestic conditions. The monetary policy of the 
principal centre must also be such as to contribute to 
the fluidity of international flows of short-term 
capital. 
If we take the analysis further, we see that it was 
not only the overvaluation of the dollar which helped 
to undermine the solidity of the position that the 
United States undoubtedly occupied as principal 
centre until the early 1970s. Nothing contributed 
more to this result than the burden of the United 
States Government's outlays on the establishment of 
a defence system with installations in every continent. 
The United States faced restrictions on its spending 
abroad precisely because of the relatively closed 
nature of its economy. With the passage of time, its 
huge military spending forced Washington to cover 
its outlays abroad with paper currency that it virtually 
forced into international circulation by obliging the 
Central Banks of other countries to build up excessive 
reserves in dollars which were subsequently 
transformed into United States Treasury debt paper. It 
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is sufficient to observe the behaviour of military 
spending -an increasing proportion of which took 
place outside the country in the 1960s- in order to 
grasp the magnitude of the distortions produced in 
the United States economy, which reduced it to a 
situation of financial dependency vis-à-vis other 
central economies. In 1973, military spending 
represented 5.6% of the United States GDP, and this 
spending reduced the capacity of the public sector to 
make investments in economic and social activities. 
From that year onwards, a marked decline was to be 
observed in the growth rate of average United States 
productivity. 
In the 10 years from 1973, productivity grew at 
no more than half the rate of the previous ten years. 
This slowdown in productivity growth did not prevent 
military spending from increasing, however, to such a 
point that it came to 6. 6% of GDP in 1983. 
Furthermore, the rate of saving dropped from 9. 5% 
to 6.7% over that same 10-year period. The truth is 
that United States society was simply not prepared for 
exercising the dominant international role that fell to 
its lot as a result of the Second World War. 
The absence of a principal centre capable of 
keeping the capitalist economy in order is of course a 
major factor in the great upsets observed in the 
international economy from the 1970s onward, the 
most striking manifestation of which is the enormous 
size of the peripheral countries' external debt. 
The disorder that took root in the international 
monetary and financial system as a result of the 
excess of liquidity caused by the crisis of the dollar 
was the factor that created favourable conditions for 
the process of indebtedness of almost all the countries 
of the periphery. In 1973, interest rates were not more 
than 2% negative, but the following year they went 
down to 6% negative, remaining extremely low until 
the end of the decade. This situation of maladjustment 
was aggravated in the second half of 1973 by the 
abrupt rise in petroleum prices, which permitted a 
group of countries with little or no capacity to absorb 
large amounts of financial resources to rapidly build 
up enormous reserves in the form of certificates of 
deposit in the international banks. 
The imbalances caused in the external accounts 
of the central countries -almost all of them heavy 
importers of petroleum- led them to boost their 
exports. Thus, the efforts of the industrial economies 
to increase their external trade in the period following 
the oil price shock brought about an increase in the 
imports of the peripheral countries as well as the 
conversion of the excess liquidity of the international 
banks into loans to those countries. The under-
developed countries, which had always had to 
struggle with a severe shortage of capital in the past, 
suddenly found themselves faced with a virtually 
unlimited supply of financial resources on the 
international market, and moreover at negative 
interest rates. 
This combination of an unrestricted supply of 
capital on the international market, plus the striving 
of the central countries to correct the imbalances in 
their external accounts caused by the sudden rise in 
oil prices, explains the rapid build-up of external debt 
by countries which sought ways of increasing their 
growth rates or simply raising their level of 
expenditure. 
The system of floating exchange rates, by 
permitting the rapid devaluation of the previously 
overvalued dollar, set off a wave of price rises at the 
international level. In the countries which were 
forcing their exports, financed by the banks which 
were trying to manage the glut of international 
liquidity, there were additional inflationary pressures 
too. Consequently, there was a run on real assets and 
on the building-up of stocks. Food prices on the 
international market rose by 54% in 1973 and 60% in 
1974, while metal prices increased by 45% and 25% 
in the same two years. Double-digit inflation was 
widespread in the industrialized capitalist world: 
something not seen since the Second World War. 
In 1979, the United States Government decided 
to abandon its carefree attitude to inflation and 
adopted a shock policy of the most uncompromising 
monetary type. The faa is that the international 
monetary system is based on the dollar, and 
Eurodollars are no more than a credit multiplier based 
on dollar deposits outside the United States. The 
United States monetary authorities therefore have the 
power to influence the international monetary market 
through manipulation of the monetary base in the 
United States. If the Federal Reserve raises interest 
rates, there is immediately a flow of financial 
resources towards that country, together with a rise in 
interest rates on the international market. 
When it applied a restrictive monetary policy in 
these circumstances, Washington discovered how 
easy it was to finance its needs abroad, thus opening 
the way to the uncontrolled expansion of its own 
expenditure. The United States current account 
remained in balance up to 1978, but at the beginning 
of the 1980s it became negative: in 1983 the deficit 
came to US$45 billion, and by 1987 it had reached 
the staggering figure of US$147 billion. 
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The deficit on the United States current account 
was the second great break in the international 
structure of the capitalist economy, and it is the basic 
cause of the abnormal rise in real interest rates that 
has taken place over the last decade. In 1980 those 
rates were already over 8%, and by 1982 they had 
reached 12%. 
Thus, two adjustment processes which took place 
in the central economies -the first one connected with 
the effort made by those countries to recover their 
external equilibrium after the first oil price shock and 
made possible by the uncontrolled glut of 
international liquidity, and the second one connected 
with the restrictive monetary policies of the United 
States Government and the financing of its fiscal 
deficit with resources attracted from abroad by high 
interest rates- lie at the root of the enormous debt 
now burdening the countries that make up the 
periphery of the capitalist system. 
The relative decline in the growth rate of 
productivity and the simultaneous drop in the rate of 
saving which were observed from the early 1970s on 
prevented the United States from playing its role as 
principal centre of the capitalist system. This process 
speeded up in the 1980s with the appearance of a 
fiscal deficit which absorbed a quantity of resources 
greater than the whole of private saving. This 
qualitative change in the international position of the 
United States economy is illustrated by the behaviour 
of the enterprises of that country. Direct Japanese 
investment in the United States rose from US$4.7 
billion in 1980 to US$53.3 billion in 1988, while 
direct United States investment in Japan grew from 
US$6.2 billion to US$16.9 billion over the same 
period. The same is true with respect to the European 
Economic Community, since direct investments by its 
member countries in the United States rose from 
US$50 billion in 1980 to US$193 billion in 1988, 
with United States direct investments in the 
Community growing from US$80 billion to US$126 
billion over the same period. 
An important indication of the changed situation 
of the United States economy is that in the last quarter 
of 1987 the payments of interest and dividends to the 
exterior exceeded the receipts under this heading. In 
1980, the net external investments position of the 
United States was positive to the tune of US$106 
billion dollars, but as from 1985 the situation became 
Figures based on Survey of Current Business, published 
in Le Monde, Paris, 31 October 1989. 
negative. In 1986, United States assets abroad totalled 
US$1 067 900 million, whereas foreign assets in the 
United States in the same year totalled US$1 331 500 
million. 
The problem now facing us is to know how the 
function of the principal centre is being carried out at 
present. The United States continues to carry out part 
of this function, since the international monetary 
system is still based on the dollar. However, the 
United States no longer plays the role of the main 
supplier of international financial resources, which is 
now carried out by Japan and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. All we need do is look at the 
balance-of-payments current accounts in recent years. 
In 1987, the deficit of US$147 billion dollars of the 
United States contrasted with the surpluses of US$84 
billion for Japan and US$50 billion for the Federal 
Republic of Germany. This situation obviously 
cannot last for ever, since it involves the growing 
indebtedness of the United States to the other two 
great central countries. As long as this situation of 
financial dependence continues, interest rates will 
continue to be high, which means growing deteriora-
tion of the United States position. The negative 
consequences of this situation for the over-indebted 
countries are only too obvious. 
In order for the capitalist economy to function 
properly in the absence of a principal centre, it is 
necessary that the main central countries should reach 
consensus on appropriate forms of regulation. It may 
be wondered whether the appearance of such 
co-ordination groups as the 10 and the seven main 
capitalist countries is not a step in this direction. 
However, there are only two countries which are 
really competing for the leadership of the system, and 
it remains to be seen whether these countries would 
not really prefer to extend the present process of 
increasing financial dependence of the United States. 
There would seem to be no doubt that we are moving 
in the direction of a system of regulation by 
consensus. However, such consensus will only reflect 
the will of a few countries, and the relative weight of 
these nations still remains to be determined. At all 
events, the possibility of a single economy playing 
the role of the principal centre no longer exists. 
8UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development), Trade and Development Report, 1988 
(UNCTAD/TDR/8), Geneva, 1988, United Nations publications, 
SalesNo.E.88.II.D.8,p.68. 
